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Comparative Law 
1. Term and Purpose 
Comparative Law describes the comparison of various laws; it is not a distinct 
body of law. This is clearer from the term in German (Rechtsvergleichung) than 
from the term in other languages (comparative law, droit comparé). Macro-
comparison is concerned with entire legal systems; micro-comparison deals with 
specific institutions or specific problems. Comparative Law thus goes beyond the 
mere study of foreign legal systems. However, the difference should not be 
exaggerated. First, adequate knowledge of foreign law is an indispensible 
prerequisite of every legal comparison. Second, even „mere― knowledge of 
foreign law necessarily contains a comparative element, if only because the 
comparatist regularly looks at another legal system from (and often for) the 
perspective of her own particular legal system. Foreign law is thus regularly 
understood and explained automatically in relationship to one’s own law. 
The actual comparison of legal systems – the discovery, explanation and 
evaluation of similarities and differences – is only one of several themes of the 
contemporary discipline of Comparative Law. A second theme concerns the 
influence between legal systems, especially the → reception of law, whether of 
individual legal institutions or of entire legal systems. With regard to Europe, this 
encompasses on the one hand the influence on European private law of different 
legal systems (Roman law, the law of member states, the law of non-European 
states). On the other hand, it includes the transmission of European law to non-
European legal systems. A third theme of Comparative Law is the development of 
a general theory of law. Here, comparative law functions as the discipline which 
attempts to understand the various legal systems in their totality and in their 
relationship to each other, without necessarily trying to avoid or minimise the 
existing differences between them. This theme was prominent in the early 20th 
century and is once again gaining attention today. 
Different purposes are ascribed to Comparative Law: it should inform national 
lawmaking, assist judges in the resolution of difficult questions, provide a basis 
for legal unification or harmonisation, or simply increase knowledge and extend 
awareness, especially in legal education. All these are purposes that legal science 
should fulfil in general. From this perspective, Comparative Law is just a special 
form of general legal science, or, phrased inversely, the comprehensive study of 
law (and, with limits, legal practice) must contain a comparative component. 
2. Methods 
In recent times there has been increased debate about the methods and theories 
of Comparative Law. No consensus has emerged, and the discussion has not yet 
exercised substantial influence on practical legal comparison. Beyond mere 
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doctrinal comparison, there are fundamentally two different methods, functional 
and cultural legal comparison. 
Functional comparison, popularised above all by Konrad Zweigert and Hein 
Kötz, starts from the premise that the function of law lies in responding to social 
problems and that all societies face in essence the same problems. This makes it 
possible to compare legal institutions, even if they display different doctrinal 
structures, as long as they fulfil the same function, because in this case they are 
functionally equivalent. For example, the → common law institution of 
→ consideration can be compared with the → formal requirements of German 
law, insofar as both fulfil the same function: as caution against the rushed 
formation of contracts and as → indicia of seriousness regarding a contractual 
promise. Understanding legal norms as responses to problems supposedly also 
makes it possible to designate which law is better and, on this basis, to reform 
domestic law or to create an international uniform law. 
Cultural comparison in contrast (sometimes called comparative legal studies or 
comparative legal cultures) rejects the reduction of law to its function and instead 
understands national law as an expression and development of the general culture 
of a society (→ legal culture). The focus here lies on the mentality expressed in a 
legal system, which is not fully observable by outsiders and can only be fully 
experienced by participants of the legal system. Because cultural differences 
(particularly those between civil and common law) are seen as unbridgeable and 
because different legal cultures are deemed worthy of protection, cultural 
comparison usually opposes comparative evaluation and legal unification as both 
impossible and undesirable. Instead, it promotes tolerance for foreign law and for 
difference in general.  
The discrepancies between the approaches are smaller than the sometimes 
fierce debate suggests. Both approaches reject a limitation of comparative law to 
the analysis of black letter law; instead, both search for the role of law in society. 
Both approaches value and accept the differences between legal systems. Properly 
understood, functional comparison does not, as is often claimed, fail to recognise 
or accept the identity of different legal systems. The focus on functional 
equivalence enables functional comparison to grasp simultaneously the 
similarities in the solutions and the differences in the ways of reaching these 
solutions. These differences in approaches can meaningfully be described as legal 
culture. Recently, this insight has been used in the attempt to bring legal culture 
and functional equivalence together under the concept of legal paradigms. 
Paradigm describes the manner in which legal systems address problems in 
specific (cultural) ways to attain (functionally equivalent) solutions. 
3. Development 
Comparative Law in the broad sense is as old as law itself. In a narrower sense, 
Comparative Law became possible only when different legal systems were 
distinguished, especially with the rise of the state monopoly on lawmaking. As 
long as European monarchs refrained from legislating in private law, private law 
doctrine and practice did not adopt an explicitly comparative method; instead, 
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legal reasoning took place with common parameters derived from the → ius 
commune, → the → lex mercatoria or → natural law. Here, the frequent 
invocation of foreign authorities (also by English courts) did not amount to 
comparison of different legal systems; rather, those authorities were considered 
sources of a common law.  
Since the beginning of the 19th century, when private law in continental 
Europe was nationalised by way of → codification, modern European 
comparative law has developed. Comparative law journals were established, and 
comparative law societies were founded—often on a national basis, since the main 
purpose of Comparative law was for a long time to provide inspiration for state 
legislation. At the same time, comparative law experienced a double-limitation, 
which largely continues until today. First, it was generally concentrated on 
Europe. The law in former colonies (with the exception of the United States) was 
not seen as sufficiently independent and was largely ignored. Non-European legal 
systems that had not been supplanted by European law, especially in Asia, Africa 
and in the Pacific, were excluded from comparative law and were relegated to the 
newly developed field of legal ethnology. Second, comparative law largely 
concentrated on private law, which was viewed as apolitical and therefore 
appeared to be the only area of law fit for strict, scientific legal comparison. 
Comparative law was long focused on the comparison of legislative texts, 
especially between continental European legal systems, which were divided into 
different → legal families, in particular depending on their French or German 
origin. The English common law, which was uncodified and traditionally 
characterised by a more prominent role for case law and inductive methods, 
presented a considerable challenge for this législation comparée, as it is called in 
French. 
Since the first Comparative Law World Congress in Paris in 1900 (which is 
somewhat arbitrarily viewed as the birth of modern comparative law), academic 
comparative law has made progress. Comparative law now goes beyond analysis 
of the texts of legal rules and instead compares the law in action; this makes it 
easier to compare civil and common law. At the same time, comparative law was 
aimed at the formulation of a common supranational law – if not at the global 
level, at least at the European level. In the 20th century, international working 
groups have been constituted that push forward unification, whether on a political 
or academic basis. However, the double-limitation of the 19
th
 Century – a 
limitation on Europe and on a presumably apolitical private law – continued. The 
emphasis on apolitical law is the only way to explain why it was so controversial 
whether socialist law could meaningfully be compared to capitalist law. Also, the 
concept of private law in comparative law remained trapped in 19
th
 century 
conceptions . The changed understanding of private law in the 20th century 
(constitutionalisation, materialisation, private law as a tool of regulation) is still 
often either ignored or seen as a corruption of private law. This is one reason why 
the apolitical private law of classical comparative law and the regulatory private 
law understanding of the EU still remain somewhat unconnected.  
 4 
4. European Private Law Studies 
European private law studies arose out of comparative law but have now 
transcended it. After the Second World War the first calls were made for a 
European-wide private law based on comparative law. Such calls have become 
stronger since the beginning of the 1990s. The aim had been to develop a unified 
European private law, based either on the similarities discovered through 
functional comparative law or on the old or a newly developed ius commune. 
Recently, more attention is being paid to the comparison among European laws in 
legal education and doctrine. Comparative law textbooks on European private 
law, some as casebooks with primary texts from the relevant legal systems, 
provide students with access to information on other legal systems. Even books on 
doctrinal questions in domestic law now regularly contain a comparative law part; 
explicit comparative law projects are valued more highly than previously. Finally, 
international cooperation has also increased (in part due to EU subsidies). Several 
new journals on comparative and European private law now exist. Above all 
various international working groups with different goals and methods are 
working towards a European private law on an explicitly comparative basis.  
Among the various projects, comparative law plays the greatest role for the 
Common Core Project. This project is compiling the similarities and differences 
between European legal systems using detailed comparative law case studies, 
largely without evaluation of these solutions. Other groups connect comparative 
law surveys with normative searches for the best solution (→ Restatements). This 
is the case for the ―Lando ―Commission on European Contract Law (→ Principles 
of European Contract Law) and the → Study Group on a European Civil Code, 
which emerged from it, as well as the European Group on Tort Law (→ Principles 
of European Tort Law). Many EU projects have a more regulatory understanding 
of private law, whether they emphasise market-liberal or retributive-social private 
law, so the comparison of the usually less regulated private law of the EU member 
states is often less important. Altogether, comparative law is now only one of 
many elements of European private law; on its own it is insufficient both as a 
foundation and as a basis of legitimacy. 
A similar development occurred among opponents of the Europeanisation of 
private law jurisprudence. For a long time comparative lawyers were almost 
unanimous in their support of a Europeanised private law; resistance came from 
scholars of domestic law. Now, some comparative lawyers also invoke a 
necessarily domestic legal culture against a Europeanised private law; others 
support a Europe-wide debate but not necessarily a unification of European 
private law. All of this means that the seemingly inextricable tie between 
comparative law and legal unification has been resolved, with liberating effect for 
both comparative law and the legal unification debate. 
Most arguments on whether and how differences among legal systems can and 
should be overcome must be found outside comparative law. This means that 
comparative law is necessary but not sufficient for the development of European 
private law. The focus of European private law is not merely on the understanding 
and evaluation of differences between legal systems but also on ways to deal with 
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these differences. Moreover, European private law must understand the role of 
law in society, but it must first and foremost develop legal rules and a European 
legal doctrine. 
5. European Law-Making 
Comparative law work is important to European Union institutions for several 
reasons. The basic question of whether the EU should and is permitted to act 
regularly contains a comparative law component. The questions of whether legal 
differences create obstacles to the → internal market and whether national law is 
insufficient according to the → subsidiarity principle cannot really be answered 
without comparative analysis of the legal systems of member states. However, the 
empirical studies that would be necessary for this are only rarely carried out 
comprehensively. Often the relevance to the internal market and the need to take 
action on the European level are asserted without substantiation. 
Once the EU decides to regulate, it depends more strongly on comparative law 
preparatory work than is the case in the domestic law-making process of 
individual states. When the EU decides on a new area of regulation, it regularly 
lacks its own legal tradition as a point of reference, so it must reach back to the 
experience of the member states or of non-European legal systems. The 
promulgation of EU laws is frequently preceded by comprehensive comparative 
law preparatory work, which is often elaborated internally and then, regrettably, 
not published. For larger projects, the EU often entrusts researchers outside EU 
institutions with such preparatory work.  
Finally, comparative law is also important in the implementation phase. EU 
law does not merely replace national law tout court; it interacts with it in complex 
ways. As a consequence, a good comparative understanding of the member state 
laws, in comparison both with each other and with EU law itself, is a prerequisite 
for the successful implementation of EU law as well as for its monitoring pursuant 
to Art 211 EC Treaty/17 TFEU.  
6. European Adjudication 
Comparative law is also important in the → European Court of Justice, even 
though the Court is limited to the interpretation of EU law and does not address 
the correct interpretation of the laws of member states. For instance, the question 
whether the application of a member state’s laws exerts excessive burdens on the 
citizens of other member states in addition to the burdens imposed on them by 
their country of origin can be answered only through a comparison between the 
relevant member state laws. Another use concerns the autonomous interpretation 
of EU law, which excludes only the direct recourse to the law of a single member 
state, not necessarily recourse to a comparison of member state laws in general. 
Comparative law is incontrovertibly necessary in the establishment of general 
principles of EU law. It is also used to fill gaps in EU law where the member 
states’ legal systems are in agreement or at least show a common development. 
However, where the EU aims at overcoming member state laws, such recourse to 
comparative law is probably impossible. 
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At the Court of Justice, comparative law arguments are predominantly 
prepared by the Advocate General, although the comprehensiveness and quality of 
these arguments differ strongly. In addition, the European Court of Justice can 
also request that the parties, especially the Commission, undertake comparative 
law preparatory work; such comparative insights can also be drawn from 
submissions of the member state. Finally, the Court itself puts together internal 
comparative law studies that remain unpublished. 
The courts of member states or European courts use decisions from the courts 
of other member states as precedent in the interpretation of EU law, though still 
too rarely. Such use does not really amount to comparative law, since it involves a 
discussion within one and the same legal system. In addition, comparative law is 
sometimes used for the interpretation and development of domestic law; this can, 
over time, lead to convergence of a common European private law. 
7. Outlook 
European private law jurisprudence is currently emancipating itself from 
comparative law in the same way that European Community Law emancipated 
itself from international law and national constitutional law. Now that 
comparative private law between the member states has achieved a considerable 
degree of knowledge, European private law can focus on other elements 
necessary. If a →  Common Frame of Reference or a European civil code should 
be successful, it cannot be grounded merely in comparative law; it also must 
persuade on other grounds. At the same time that comparative law becomes less 
important, European private law can concentrate stronger on its normative 
components and its connections to the EU and its law. Simultaneously, its 
decreased importance within European private law should enable comparative law 
in Europe to once again focus on questions other than the unification of European 
private law. Once European private law has emancipated itself from comparative 
law, comparative law can hopefully turn more attention to other matters like 
public law and the comparison with non-European legal system, which over a 
long period has notably retreated into the background. 
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